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For purposes of coverage under title insurance policy, a notice of abatement action is not
a defect, lien, or encumbrance on title.
Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v Tope (2014) 233 CA4th 437

In a cross-action against a title insurance company following a default on a real estate loan
to purchase and rehabilitate a home, the court of appeal granted summary judgment in favor of
the insurer, First American Title. The plaintiffs, investors in the loan, sued various parties
(including First American) for damages arising from the alleged failure to follow up on the status
of a release of notice of abatement action, which had been listed on the preliminary title report as
an exception to coverage, with a statement that “Prior to close of Escrow Alliance Title
Company [the escrow holder] will require a FULL RELEASE be obtained.” The investors had
been solicited by Stockton Mortgage Real Estate Loan Servicing Corporation (Stockton
Mortgage) for money to be used to fund the loan. Stockton Mortgage was one of the crosscomplainants that initiated the cross-action against First American, Alliance, and two of
Alliance’s employees.
Before close of escrow, Alliance had contacted the County Environmental Health
Department to obtain a release of the notice of abatement, but the County would not issue the
release because violations still existed. The lender’s policy covered “a defect in or lien or
encumbrance on the title” of the property and did not list a notice of abatement as an exception
from coverage. The court concluded that the notice of abatement was not a defect, lien, or
encumbrance on title to the property; instead, it was only a notice that the premises were
substandard, which merely related to the physical condition of the property and raised the issue
of future enforcement. Further, the accrual of enforcement costs did not transform the notice of
abatement into a defect in or a lien or encumbrance on title. Although the County engaged in
some limited abatement activity and sought to recoup its “enforcement costs” (totaling $2005
and paid by Alliance before close of escrow), the County had not recorded a lien against the
property to recover its costs. Any accrual after the close of escrow, as a post-policy event, would
not be covered under the policy.
In any event, the cross-complainants were not insured under the lender’s policy. Stockton
Mortgage never had an interest in the land or held an indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
Rather, Stockton Management was named as the beneficiary under the deed of trust.
Furthermore, it had assigned its beneficial interest under the deed of trust to the investors.

Without an interest in the property or indebtedness under the deed of trust after the assignment to
the investors, the cross-complainants were not insured under the policy.
The court also rejected the cross-complainants’ argument that because they had potential
liability for warranties and covenants made in connection with the assignment of the deed of
trust, they were still covered under the policy. The cross-complainants failed to identify what
warranties or covenants they gave to the investors as part of the assignment. They also failed to
establish that they had standing as third party beneficiaries under the policy by way of a
servicing agreement with the investors. According to the court (233 CA4th at 451), “This novel
argument goes nowhere.”
The cross-complainants argued that Alliance, acting as agent for First American, orally
agreed to remove the abatement notice before the close of escrow. The only evidence for this
purported oral agreement was the preliminary report; the court refused to infer an oral agreement
based on the statement in the report. At most, the evidence showed that Alliance, not First
American, entered into an oral agreement.
The court also found without merit the cross-complainants’ negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and implied and equitable indemnity causes of action.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Alliance Title Company was able to dodge liability for failing to
inform its insured about the county’s recorded and unreleased Notice of Abatement
Action because the court of appeal deemed that notice was not a defect, lien, or
encumbrance against the title that Alliance was insuring, such that the failure to
mention it as an exception in the insurance policy did not make the insurer liable.
Everyone appreciates that title insurance policies insure titles to real property, not
the property itself. There is a difference between a defect in the soil of property and a
defect in the title to that soil, with only the latter being covered by a title insurance
policy. But while the difference between the two may often be clear, their paths are
often murky and convergent.
A faulty condition of property frequently must follow a long, winding course before it
elevates itself to a condition of title that a title insurer must report to its customer. The
property flaw may start life as a mere potential defect in property (e.g., a loose screw
in a piece of wood) that everyone except a fussy owner may ignore, both physically
and from a title perspective. If the condition gets too bad (the screw gets too loose),

someone (e.g., a tenant or a neighbor) may complain about it, and someone else
(such as a building inspector) may do something about it, e.g., order its repair. A
report may be filed and the condition will thereby be elevated into a formal grievance
or command to the property owner to fix. See Health & S C §17980. But the existence
of such a commanding document does not necessarily mean that the owner’s title has
as yet been impaired. According to this decision, a governmental order to abate a
code violation is not yet a defect, nor a lien nor an encumbrance, on title as to make
the owner’s title unmarketable.
(Technically, the limitations of marketable title should inform interested purchasers
of the property that they should provide for inspection contingencies in their offers
rather than expect traditional marketable title to function as an exit device at close of
escrow; she may be getting a marketable title even if there is a screw loose
somewhere bothering an inspector.)
Only later—after a local official has made an authorized correction of the disrepair
and the municipality has failed to recover those costs from the owner—might the
owner’s title be brought into the picture. If the repair bill isn’t reimbursed, Health & S C
§17980.2(b) allows a lien to be imposed and recorded. Once a recorded lien is on the
property, not only does the house itself owe the repair cost (CC §1114; CCP §1180),
but equally importantly, so does its next owner, whether or not she ever assented to
its imposition. The repair cost has become a lien on the land—like a mortgage—
intruding on the current owner’s ability to transfer marketable title to the purchaser
unless it is removed. Purchasers get the law much more on their side at close of
escrow when and if a physical defect has elevated itself into a title defect.
The stakes also get considerably higher because a defect affecting title makes that
title unmarketable whether or not it carries any demonstrable economic harm along
with it. A purchaser can reject a title as unmarketable because it is subject to an
easement or covenant or declaration of CCRs, even though the property itself may be
a good deal more valuable with it than without it.
So transactors in real estate have to treat governmental complaints differently from
liens and encumbrances and defects on title because the system treats them so
differently. With or without superlien priority, an old physical complaint recently
elevated into a title defect may have acquired a legal stature it previously lacked. That
makes it unsurprising that title insurance companies need to report on defective

conditions that may someday grow into liens on title differently from how they treat the
conditions that are already liens. Conventional mortgages, easements, or restrictive
covenants generally impacted titles long ago, when they were first recorded
(regardless of how much they were paid down, used, or enforced), so purchasers and
lenders had to be warned of them at the start, differently from those inchoate liens that
spring up when a local government gets mad enough.—Roger Bernhardt

